OUAGADOUGOU, BURKINA FASO – In 1998 water in Ghana’s Akosombo and Kpong Dams fell below its operating level. As the dams provide 95% of Ghana’s total electricity supply, power shortages afflicted the entire nation.
Some blamed Burkina Faso for building its own dams and irrigation projects upstream. Others accused Togo, Benin, Mali and Cote d’Ivoire. All six nations wanted to dam more water for themselves.
Global security analysts warned of ‘potential water wars’ in the already volatile region.
But at PAGEV, Kwame Odame Ababio saw an opportunity for regional integration. Aware of formidable obstacles that lay in his path, he sought to avoid or overcome them.
One obstacle was bureaucratic infighting. From 2004-2007 the Global Environmental Facility and UNEP tried to establish a statutory framework for the Volta Basin Authority (VBA), but up to now had no concrete outcomes. Nothing had been implemented.
And no wonder. “They saw the Volta as an environmental problem to solve and sought a holistic solution,” observed Ababio. But the crisis was largely a structural problem over water resources, where “the environmental ministers had no jurisdiction. No knowledge. No authority. We included them in our technical committees, because we found that it is easier to bring environment to water, than water to the environment.”
A second obstacle involved legal language. Opposing status and conventions governed the river differently on each side of the border. As a former British colony, Ghana operated under Common Law, whereas Burkina’s government applied Roman Law. One allocated riparian rights to landowners; the latter held all water in trust by the state. Common law was a simple document; Roman law was multi-referenced to precedents.
But this too was not insurmountable. “The legal differences were time consuming but ultimately healthy – conflicts provide creative tension that helped bond us,” said Ababio.
A third obstacle was political will. Countries signed onto the Volta Basin Authority, but what was their level of commitment to it? Togo and Benin both wanted dams, and so had active interest. But Mali was more worried about the Niger River and Cote d’Ivoire had other concerns. “Requests for inputs took years,” said Ababio. “You send questionnaires, but get no response. Sometimes it seemed like nations were being asked to join but delegates didn’t know why, other than per diem.” So with 85% of the basin, the bulk of rain, and governance, fell on Ghana and Burkina Faso.
Complicating political will was the challenge of transparency and participation in decisions. Democracy must be strong to allow for the necessary decentralization of water governance structures, yet all levels are not the same. “Some countries may get suspicious if the VBA plans to encourage grassroots activity and involvement within their borders,” said Ababio. “They see a threat.” Burkina and Ghana did not.
The biggest obstacle was the top-heavy and nature of central authority, wrapped up in red tape and diplomatic protocol. “Because our countries deal government-to-government, I am not allowed to meet with communities or NGOs from across the border, and neither is my counterpart,” said Aaron Aduna, from Bolgatanga in Ghana. “It was a burden on us.”
PAGEV addressed this cumbersome obstacle in two ways.
Working within yet beneath the national structure, it established a new, local, trans-boundary pilot zone, a bilateral consultations mechanism in which four districts, departments and municipalities – Bawku, Garu, Bittou, and Zabre could focus inward on the White Volta tributaries they shared.
Turning to inter-state structures, it revitalized the idea of a ‘Code of Conduct’ as the first step in aligning the interests of all six nations under a formal institutional arrangement. “Going through national parliaments to sign a treaty would have been a long and tedious process that would have eaten up funds for pilots with no measurable sign of progress,” said Ababio. “So the Code was seen as a short cut that contained all the benefits of agreement with none of the formal red tape.”
PAGEV brokered the role, but moved up the chain of command. More people at high levels got involved, including the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, as the process went on. And the national stakeholders, based on PAGEV pilots, brought their influence to bear.
All six nations have signed on. Now if just four ratify it, the Code goes into effect.
Written bay Jamie Workman